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Supply of Hours per Day and 
Days per Week—Evidence from 
the Canadian Labour Market 
Activity Survey
Richard E. Mueller
The University of Lethbridge
A significant amount of research has been conducted on the deter-
minants of the supply of labor.  In these studies the quantity of labor
supplied is usually counted as the number of hours supplied per year
or per week, largely owing to the fact that most labor force surveys do
not disaggregate work hours more finely than the weekly level.1   The
number of hours per week, of course, is simply the product of days
worked per week and hours worked per day, assuming both remain
constant.  Still, there is reason to believe that different workers desire
to work a different number of days per week and hours per day, even
though the number of weekly hours that each wishes to work may
remain constant.   For example, many individuals in the nursing pro-
fession regularly work three 12-hour shifts per week.  This is not nec-
essarily in response to the lack of options, but rather because they
select into an occupation that offers a variety of days/hours combina-
tions.  In such cases, the use of weekly, monthly, or yearly hourly
aggregates may mask a number of interesting characteristics of labor
supply.  For one, the fixed costs of supplying labor may differ depend-
ing on the unit of analysis.  It is well-known that daily costs of work in
terms of child care expenses, commuting costs, etc., may affect daily
labor supply decisions.  There may also exist hourly costs of employ-
ment which could likewise influence this dimension of labor supply.
Furthermore, employer constraints on the hours and days that one is
able to work could limit the optimal days/hours combination from the
employee’s point of view.  To the extent that these constraints exist,
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optimal days/hours pairs may only become available as employees sort
into new positions that offer a more desirable package.  
A better understanding of the desires of individuals in choosing
their hours/days combinations could ultimately lead employers to offer
competitive weekly work schedules to employees, thus reducing turn-
over and absenteeism rates as well as related costs.  For governments,
such information may be useful in planning for future infrastructure
projects, or how best to target day care subsidies.  
This chapter will investigate in some detail the days per week and
hours per day decisions of workers.  The use of a unique data set allows
us to decompose the usual weekly hours aggregate into daily hours and
weekly days.  The relevant literature will be discussed in the next sec-
tion.  The third section presents the data to be used in subsequent anal-
yses.   A preliminary look at the patterns of weekly working times for
males and females, both paid employees and self-employed workers, is
covered in the next section.  A simple econometric model of supply of
hours and days is the topic of the following section.  This largely serves
as a check on the data and will allow us to investigate further some of
the pertinent determinants of the hours/days labor supply decision. The
next section presents and estimates a simple model of job change
behavior.  Since individuals may be constrained from working their
desired days and hours at any one job, they may change jobs in
response to these constraints.  Following that is a more detailed look at
the actual hours and days changes of job-changers.  The final section
concludes and offers some areas for potentially fruitful future research.
Our results show that individuals tend to be clustered around a
standard five-day, eight hours per day workweek, with men exhibiting
much less flexibility around these norms than women.  The self-
employed, regardless of gender, are much less likely to work standard
hours and days compared with those engaged in paid employment.  It
is well-known that women supply less labor when they have young
children.  But our evidence also shows that women with young chil-
dren supply less labor, in terms of both hours and days, than those
without young children, although the percentage drop in days is larger.
This is not well-known and suggests that the costs of childrearing are
borne on a daily rather than an hourly basis.  In other words, women
with young children find it more cost-effective to reduce days when
reducing weekly hours.
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We also discovered that job-changers desire flexibility in their
weekly schedules.  Not only do they display a larger variance in hours
and days at their initial jobs compared with those who did not change
jobs, but this variance increases further as they move into their new
positions.  This suggests that employees may be constrained within
jobs from attaining their desired hours/days combination.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Previous research has addressed a variety of related time aggrega-
tion problems.  Hanoch (1980a,b) distinguished between the hours per
week and weeks per year decision in a reservation wage model of
female labor supply.  Blank (1988) built on this model to allow for
simultaneity of the hours and weeks decision.  She also allowed for dis-
continuities in the labor supply decision that can occur as a result of
fixed costs of employment or if workers are constrained by firms who
will only allow a minimum number of hours per week and/or weeks
per year.  She concluded that the evidence provides support for the the-
ory that female heads face either significant fixed costs of employment
or structural barriers to low levels of yearly weeks or weekly hours of
work.2  Also, decisions regarding hours of work per week and weeks of
work per year were made independently, albeit simultaneously.  The
lesson is that using aggregated annual hours in many analyses may be
inappropriate because the variable lacks the necessary detail.  
The recent literature on Canadian labor supply has also analyzed
the changes in hours worked over time, usually at the aggregate of
annual or weekly hours worked, and often in the context of an explana-
tion for earnings polarization.  Morissette, Myles, and Picot (1993)
have shown that the 1980s experienced a widening in the distribution
of annual hours worked between workers.  Morissette and Sunter
(1994) and Morissette (1995) showed that the distribution of weekly
hours also widened during the 1980s; fewer individuals worked 35–40
hour weeks, while the fraction working either shorter or longer hours
rose.  Other research has addressed the increase in multiple job hold-
ings and part-time work (Krahn 1995; Logan 1994; Pold 1994, 1995).
One of the lessons of this research is that aggregate measures of
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employment, such as annual hours worked, tend to obscure the funda-
mental underlying changes in the labor market over time, even though
aggregate means may show only modest changes.
Just as aggregated annual hours hide important details, it is plausi-
ble that weekly hours may also be an inappropriate unit of analysis
because the choice of days per week and hours per day could be related
and simultaneous decisions on the part of workers.  In addition, there
can be fixed costs per day of work and even costs per hour of work.
Aggregation of work hours into hours per year and hours per week
does not allow us to investigate the complexity of the workers’ deci-
sions.
The costs of child care are frequently used in estimating the proba-
bility of female labor force participation.  Many of these studies are
nicely summarized in Cleveland et al. (1996).  Blau and Robins (1988)
and Ribar (1992), for example, found that child care costs had a nega-
tive effect on female labor force participation decisions.  Cleveland et
al. (1996) arrived at similar results using Canadian data.  Generally,
such empirical work is supportive of economic theory in that higher
costs of child care lead to lower female labor force participation rates.
What these studies have in common is the use of female participation
as the dimension of labor supply analyzed.  One exception to this is the
study by Michalopoulos et al. (1992), which used hours supplied as the
unit of analysis.  They discovered that reduced child care tax credits
resulted in a reduction in hours for women currently employed.  These
studies, however, did not address the impact of child care costs on the
supply of hours and days.  In another example of the importance of
fixed costs on the labor supply decision, Zax and Kain (1991) showed
that increases in commuting times generally increased the probability
of employee quits.
Aside from the fixed costs of employment, employer inflexibility
could be the factor that limits the days and hours that people are able to
work, despite their preferences.  Altonji and Paxson (1992) showed that
married women who changed jobs exhibited more of a change in
weekly and yearly hours compared with those who did not change
jobs.  They attributed this to employers restricting hours choices, which
necessitated job change to attain the desired number of hours.  Retten-
maier (1996) discovered that individuals who prefer low or high hours
of work were more likely to be self-employed because they had a lower
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probability of finding these hours in paid jobs.  In a related paper, Kahn
and Lang (1995) found that over half of Canadians in 1985 were dissat-
isfied with the number of weekly hours they usually worked.  Of these,
about two-thirds expressed the desire for more weekly hours, not
fewer.  Of course, an increase in weekly hours can come from increas-
ing days per week or hours per day or both.  If fixed costs per day of
work are high relative to hourly costs, we would find that these workers
desired to put in more hours per day in increasing their hours per week.
If the hourly costs of work are higher, we would expect the opposite,
assuming that their are no employer-imposed constraints on the avail-
ability of hours and days.
There is, in fact, some evidence suggesting that the aggregation of
days and hours into weekly hours results may result in poor labor sup-
ply estimates.  Hamermesh (1996) provided estimates of the reduced-
form correlates of days and daily hours in the absence of a formal
model.  He concluded that we cannot treat weekly hours as a reliable
unit of analysis because daily hours and days per week both vary.  He
found that daily hours, in both the United States and Germany, tended
to vary more than days per week in response to various exogenous
shocks such as changes in the unemployment rate.   This implies that
the cost of changing days per week is higher than the cost of changing
hours per day.
We want to dissect the weekly hours decision faced by workers.
The first step will be to model this days and hours decision.  If there are
significant fixed costs to the number of hours per week and the number
of weeks per year worked, fixed costs in daily and hourly terms may
also be important in determining the combination of hours per day and
days per week.  The daily act of preparing for work and commuting to
and from the work site results in substantial sunk costs that are borne
by workers.  In other words, are the hours per day and days per week
decision joint?  Are the determinants of the two the same?  Are there
significant costs per day or per hour of work which prevent people
from seeking jobs?  Or is it employers who constrain the available set
of hours and days that employees may choose?  
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DATA
The 1990 Labour Market Activity Survey (LMAS) of 1990 will be
utilized in the empirical part of the chapter.  The LMAS is a unique
data set that includes variables for days per week and hours per day
usually worked—variables which are not normally found in labor force
surveys.3  Data on up to five jobs held by each individual in 1990 are
also included.  This will ultimately allow us to make inferences about
the motives behind job change.  The data set also includes other vari-
ables for the reason the respondent left the job and the number of addi-
tional monthly hours the respondent desired to work.  This information
will be useful in deducing whether it is fixed costs that result in various
hours/days combinations, or whether it is rigidities in the labor market
that do not make the desired combinations of hours/days available to
employees.  
The sample includes those between the ages of 17 and 64 who
lived throughout the country, with the exception of the Northwest and
Yukon territories.  Those who did not hold any job in 1990 were elimi-
nated from the sample, as were those who did not work at a paid job
(i.e., the self-employed) or who attended school full-time at any time
during the year.4  Those who held more than two jobs in 1990 were
eliminated.  To avoid job overlap (due to moonlighting, for example),
those who started a second job in a week preceding the completion of
the first job were dropped, as were respondents who claimed to work
more than 18 hours per day or to have earned less than $1.00 per hour
at either job.  Satisfying these criteria were 16,820 males and 14,635
females.5  The sample is further disaggregated into job-stayers (14,577
males and 13,245 females) and job-changers who moved from one paid
job to another paid job (1,563 males and 1,318 females).6
WEEKLY WORK PATTERNS 
An initial look at the data reveals that hours of work tend to be
more flexible than days of work.  Table 1 gives the joint distribution of
hours and days for males and females.  We define the standard workday
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Table 1 Joint Distribution of Hours per Day and Days per Week, 
All Workers, Paid and Self-Employed Workers, Males 
and Females (%)
Category/ Days per
hours per day week 1–4 5 6–7 Total
Males
All workers (n = 18,328)
< 4.0 0.18 0.23 0.09 0.50
4.0–5.9 0.51 00.74 0.20 1.45
6.0–7.4 0.69 4.44 0.62 5.75
7.5–8.5 1.79 58.55 3.82 64.16
8.6–9.9 0.32 5.36 1.53 7.21
> 9.9 4.06 8.56 8.32 20.94
Total 7.55 77.88 14.58 100.00
Paid workers (n = 16,280)
< 4.0 0.19 0.18 0.07 0.44
4.0–5.9 0.51 0.76 0.15 1.42
6.0–7.4 0.73 4.70 0.53 5.96
7.5–8.5 1.83 63.36 2.99 68.18
8.6–9.9 0.32 5.29 0.88 6.49
> 9.9 4.44 7.75 5.33 17.52
Total 8.02 82.04 9.95 100.00
Self-employed (n = 2,048)
< 4.0 0.15 0.63 0.24 1.02
4.0–5.9 0.54 0.59 0.54 1.67
6.0–7.4 0.34 2.34 1.32 4.00
7.5–8.5 1.56 20.31 10.45 32.32
8.6–9.9 0.24 5.96 6.64 12.84
> 9.9 1.07 14.94 32.13 48.14





hours per day week 1–4 5 6–7 Total
Females
All workers (n = 15,263)
< 4.0 1.13 1.47 0.33 2.93
4.0–5.9 3.97 4.48 0.56 9.01
6.0–7.4 5.37 15.20 0.89 21.46
7.5–8.5 8.25 46.28 2.44 56.97
8.6–9.9 0.39 2.10 0.55 3.04
> 9.9 2.37 2.14 2.06 6.57
Total 21.48 71.67 6.83 100.00
Paid workers (n = 14,635)
< 4.0 1.11 1.42 0.23 2.76
4.0–5.9 4.00 4.48 0.50 8.98
6.0–7.4 5.46 15.54 0.77 21.77
7.5–8.5 8.41 47.47 2.15 58.03
8.6–9.9 0.38 2.00 0.42 2.80
> 9.9 2.44 1.98 1.23 5.65
Total 21.80 72.89 5.30 100.00
Self-employed (n = 628)
< 4.0 1.75 2.55 2.71 7.01
4.0–5.9 3.34 4.46 1.91 9.71
6.0–7.4 3.35 7.32 3.66 14.33
7.5–8.5 4.29 18.63 9.39 32.31
8.6–9.9 0.64 4.46 3.50 8.60
> 9.9 0.80 5.89 21.34 28.03
Total 14.17 43.31 42.51 100.00
NOTE: Totals may not add due to rounding error.
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to be in the 7.5 to 8.5 hour range and the standard workweek to be five
days.  For all male workers, 78 percent normally worked the standard
five-day workweek.  Only 64 percent of male workers worked the stan-
dard workday.  As expected, female workers show greater diversity in
their usual hours and days, as 72 percent worked the standard five-day
week and 57 percent worked the “normal” workday.  
Because we consider the self-employed as being somewhat less
constrained by the days and hours restrictions of paid employees, we
expect this group of workers to exhibit greater variance in their
observed hours and days.  Further breaking down the sample into paid
workers and self-employed workers does in fact reveal this; i.e., paid
workers tended to work more standard days and hours compared to the
self-employed.  Some 82 percent of paid males worked a five-day week
in 1990, compared to only 45 percent of self-employed males.  In fact,
over 51 percent of self-employed males worked six- or seven-day
weeks.  Usual work hours were also more standardized for paid work-
ers, with 68 percent working normal hours.  By contrast, only 32 per-
cent of self-employed males worked between 7.5 and 8.5 hours per
day, with 48 percent working 10 hours per day or more.  Both the hours
and days distributions are more heavily weighted at the top for self-
employed males.  One interesting result is that over 4 percent of paid
workers worked at least 10 hours per day but less than five days per
week.  This suggests that some workers were able to work longer hours
and fewer days within a standard-length workweek.
Women generally show more flexibility in their hours and days
combinations compared to men.  For paid women, 73 percent worked a
standard five-day week and 58 percent worked the standard workday—
about 10 percentage points lower than the equivalent values for males.
Paid females were also much more likely to work shorter hours and
days than their male counterparts and less likely to work longer days
and hours.  As with the case of males, self-employed females showed
much more variation in their hours and days; more were likely to work
larger numbers of hours and days compared to female paid workers.
They were also more concentrated in the lower tail of the hours per day
distribution.  Compared to self-employed males, females were more
likely to work both shorter hours and days.
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The patterns for both genders are generally consistent with those
obtained by Hamermesh (1996) in his comparison of U.S. and German
labor supply.7
A SIMPLE MODEL OF LABOR SUPPLY
Loosely extending a standard labor supply model such as the one
found in Blank (1988), we can model the days and hours labor supply
decision and then estimate the model.  Each individual is assumed to
maximize his or her utility, which is a function of the level of consump-




C = Y – αDw + Dw Hw W(1 – μ)
Dl = D – Dw
Hl = Dw (H – Hw),
where C is weekly consumption and is simply the amount of exoge-
nous income available (Y) plus the amount of labor income earned per
week.  The latter is the usual number of days worked per week (Dw)
times the usual number of hours worked per day (Hw) times the usual
hourly wage (W).  Finally, we subtract the costs of employment for
both days of work and hours of work.  The simple act of preparing for
and commuting to work involves costs which are borne daily, regard-
less of the amount of time spent on the job.  Other costs, however, are a
function of the amount of time per day spent on the job.  Costs such as
day care and parking, for example, may be on an hourly basis.  We
assume that α represents the fixed costs per day of work, and μ are the
costs per hour of work.  
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Leisure is divided into days per week of leisure (Dl), which is the
number of days per week (D) less the number of days per week
worked, and hours of leisure (Hl), which is the weekly amount of lei-
sure consumed on days worked and is simply the number of days per
week worked times the number of hours on these days not at work (H –
Hw).  Because hours and days of leisure may be qualitatively different
for individuals, they enter the utility functions separately.
We know that solving the above problem yields Marshallian
demand functions for hours of leisure and days of leisure, which can be
transposed into labor supply functions for days per week of work and
hours per day of work.  In other words, we can solve for
(2a) Dw = Dw(Y,W,δ,α,μ)
(2b) Hw = Hw(Y,W,δ,α,μ)
where δ is a vector of demographic and job-related variables that we
assume will affect supply for hours and days of work. 
If we assume that leisure (in either days or hours) is a normal good,
and that the substitution effect is greater than the income effect, then an
increase in the cost of days or hours should increase the amount of lei-
sure taken.  Obversely, the number of hours and days of work supplied
should decrease as the direct costs of each increase.  Thus, we assume
that ∂Dw / ∂α < 0 and ∂Hw / ∂μ < 0.  Furthermore, if we assume that
hours and days are substitutes, the cross-partial derivatives will both be
positive.  In other words, ∂Dw / ∂μ > 0 and ∂Hw / ∂α > 0 says that as the
fixed cost per hour (day) of work increases, the individual will increase
his or her supply of days (hours) because the opportunity cost of doing
so is now relatively less expensive.
To operationalize the model into days and hours, we assume a lin-
ear approximation of the relationship between the supply of labor and




* = +X1 1 1β ε
Hw
* = +X2 2 2β ε
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where X1 and X2 are vectors of individual and job characteristics that
determine the number of days and hours supplied, β1 and β2 are the
vector of coefficients, and ε1 and ε2 are the usual white noise error
terms.  Of course,  and are only observed if the respondent is
actually a labor force participant; they are written in natural logarithms. 
Eqs. 3a and 3b, however, are limited because they implicitly
assume that the hours and days decisions are separable.  They also
implicitly assume that there are no discontinuities in labor supply
choices.  It is well-established that discontinuities do in fact arise from
the fixed costs of work (hourly, daily, weekly, etc.) as well as
employer-imposed constraints which may limit the maximum or mini-
mum hours that a person is able to work, thus narrowing the choice set
of the worker.  Still, it provides a starting point to analyze the determi-
nants of hours and days of work.  From estimation of Eqs. 3a and 3b,
certain implications about daily and hourly costs of employment can be
ascertained.
The reduced-from estimates of Eqs. 3a and 3b, with and without
job controls, are presented in Table 2.8  For economy of space, only the
coefficients discussed are included (summary statistics and full results
appear in Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix).  At the bottom of the
table, the results from Breusch-Pagan tests allow us to reject in all four
cases the hypothesis that the days and hours regressions are indepen-
dent.  The correlation coefficients of the residuals are positive, under-
lining something we discovered in Table 1: workers who work, for
unexplained reasons, more (fewer) hours also tend to work more
(fewer) days.  Still, the magnitudes of these correlation coefficients are
small.  Since the dependent variables are natural logarithms, we can
compare the effect of the independent variables on hours and days.
Significance levels of pairwise t-statistics, which test the hypothesis
that the effect of the independent variable is the same on both hours
and days, are also included.  The coefficients on the number of children
in the days and hours regressions, for example, are significantly differ-
ent in the case of females but not in the case of males.  
The results show that both men and women above 19 years of age
work more hours and days compared to the control group of individu-
als between 17 and 19 years of age.  For males, hours and days peak at
25–34 years of age, while hours and days for females reach a maxi-





Table 2 OLS Estimates of ln (Hours) and ln (Days), With and Without Job Controls, Males and Femalesa,b
Males Females
No job controls Job controls No job controls Job controls
Independent variable Hours Days t Hours Days t Hours Days t Hours Days t
Age
20–24 years 0.0493 0.0385 0.0501 0.0413 0.0327 0.0853 *** 0.0248 0.0787 ***
(4.067) (3.667) (4.239) (3.970) (1.441) (3.373) (1.115) (3.160)
25–34 years 0.0549 0.0412 0.0537 0.0460 0.0225 0.0785 *** 0.0010 0.0553 ***
(4.516) (3.918) (4.522) (4.392) (1.008) (3.156) (4.500) (2.251)
35–44 years 0.0371 0.0322 0.0427 0.0392 0.0106 0.0688 *** –0.0175 0.0385 ***
(3.006) (3.007) (3.518) (3.667) (0.467) (2.735) (0.787) (1.542)
45–54 years 0.0227 0.0310 0.0317 0.0377 –0.0176 0.0395 *** –0.0413 0.0118 ***
(1.792) (2.832) (2.530) (3.414) (0.763) (1.541) (1.816) (0.463)
55–64 years –0.0165 0.0198 ** –0.0036 0.0269 * –0.0807 –0.0362 –0.1025 –0.0637
(1.251) (1.732)  (0.278) (2.337) (3.371) (1.360) (4.319) (2.399)
Number of children
Ages 0–2 –0.0023 –0.0031 –0.0030 –0.0035 –0.0195 –.00742 * –0.0163 –0.0681 *
(0.579) (0.893) (0.752) (1.003) (2.867) (9.788) (2.430) (9.102)
Ages 3–5 0.0059 0.0005 0.0060 0.0012 –0.0332 –0.0645 * –0.0320 –0.0616 *




No job controls Job controls No job controls Job controls
Independent variable Hours Days t Hours Days t Hours Days t Hours Days t
Ages > 5 0.0022 0.0007 0.0011 0.0005 –0.0192 –0.0277 * –0.0167 –0.0224 ***
(1.445) (0.559) (7.250) (0.348) (7.749) (10.082) 6.843 8.206
Constant 2.1163 1.5883 * 2.1341 1.5712 * 1.9751 1.5201 * 1.9535 1.4841 *
(151.034) (130.867) (127.509) (106.577) (75.150) (52.004) 61.491 (41.755)
R2 0.0313 0.0086 0.0841 0.0305 0.0276 0.0696 0.0408 0.0713
Correlation coefficient 
of residuals
0.1455 0.1379 0.1545 0.1371
Breusch–Pagan test of 
independence
(p-value)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Number of 
observations
16,280 16,280 14,635 14,635
a Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.
*** = Significant at 1% level.
** = Significant at 5% level.
* = Significant at 10% level.
b Controls for marital status, relationship to family head, education, region, mother tongue, immigrant, and visible minority were all included in
all regressions.  Job control variables are firm size, industry, occupation, union coverage, tenure, and pension coverage.  Age 17–19 is the omit-
ted variable.
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cycle, labor supply in both dimensions declines slowly.  For both gen-
ders, the increase in weekly hours is the result of a larger percentage
increase in days than hours, but only in the case of women are these
differences statistically significant at 10 percent.
These results are somewhat at odds with those of Hamermesh
(1996), who found that the inverse U-shaped pattern was steeper in the
case of hours than days for both U.S. and German male and female
workers.  He reasoned that the steeper hours profile implied that hours
are less costly to add than days.  In our case, male workers do add
hours slightly more rapidly than days until they reach their peaks
between 25 and 34 years.  Thereafter, hours fall off more rapidly than
days.  Because 82 percent of the males in our sample work a standard
five-day workweek, flexibility in weekly hours obviously comes from
changes in hours.  For female workers, it is days that rise more rapidly
to a peak at 20–24 years, and then both days and hours decline at a sim-
ilar rate.  Thus females appear to be more flexible in altering both days
and hours than males.
 Because women still generally hold the primary responsibility for
child care, the presence of young children should decrease their labor
supply.  Indeed, the number of young children present does have a neg-
ative effect on supply of both hours and days.  In the case of no job
controls, the point estimates show that the presence of a child two years
of age or less is related to a drop in hours of almost 2 percent but a drop
in days of over 7 percent.  By contrast, the presence of young children
has no statistically significant effect on the male supply of hours and
days.  Thus, the data show that young children are correlated with a
decline both the hours and days supplied by the mother.  If the fixed
costs of child care are incurred on a daily basis versus an hourly basis,
we would expect the decline in labor supply to be borne by a larger
decline in days.  This indeed is the case.
JOB-CHANGE BEHAVIOR AND HOURS PER DAY 
AND DAYS PER WEEK
Insofar as hours and days combinations within jobs are less than
optimal for workers, we might expect job change to occur in order to
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attain the desired combination.  Since the LMAS contains data on up to
five job changes per worker per year, we can use this information to
estimate a model of job change behavior that will help give further
insights into the daily and hourly fixed costs of labor supply.
Modifying the labor force participation model of Blank (1988), we
assume that an individual i in period j attains the utility level 
), where is hours of work per day at the job held in period j,
is days per week at job j, and represent the weekly
earnings at job j, which has an hourly wage rate of .  If we assume
that the individual has perfect information about all the arguments in his
or her utility function, and that job mobility is cost-free, then an individ-
ual will change jobs only if
(4)
If we further assume that P* is linearly dependent on the three argu-
ments in the utility function, as well as other demographic and eco-
nomic variables that determine job change, we can write
(5) P* = λZ + v,
where Z is the aforementioned vector of job change determinants, λ is
its corresponding vector of coefficients, and v is the white noise error
term.  Utility is unobservable and therefore so is the variable P*.  What
we do observe, however, is a dichotomous variable P, where 
P = 1 if P* ≥ 0 and P = 0 if P* < 0.
If we assume that an individual is in equilibrium at the initial job, util-
ity is being maximized.  A shock which affects one or more arguments
in the individual’s utility function may result in the utility no longer
being maximized at that job, and job change will occur if utility can be
maximized at a new job.  The birth of a child, for example increases the
fixed costs of employment along both time dimensions.  If the fixed
costs of hours are more costly than the fixed costs of days, we would
expect job-changers to want to move out of jobs with longer hours.
Conversely, if days are more costly than hours, we would expect the
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Probit estimates of Eq. 5 appear in Table 3.  Again, only the rele-
vant coefficients are included with full results contained in Table A3 in
the appendix.  Independent variables include all personal and job con-
trols used in the previous analysis, plus variables for ln (hours) and ln
(days) at the initial job, a dummy which equals 1.0 if respondents said
that they desired more monthly hours at their initial job, and interac-
tions of this variable with ln (hours) and ln (days).  Separate probits are
also estimated without personal and job controls.  Of the 16,280 males
in our sample, some 1,563 changed jobs in 1990 for a probability of
0.096.  For women, the probability of moving from a first to a second
job was 0.090 (1,318 changers from a sample of 14,635).
The effects of personal and job characteristics on job change are
very similar for both genders.  Probability of job change decreases as
age increases.  The presence of small children also reduces the likeli-
hood of job change for both genders, especially women.  Older chil-
dren have little influence on the job change behavior of men but
continue to slightly lessen female mobility.  Union members tend to
exhibit less job mobility as do those with more job tenure.  These
results are consistent with the literature.9
The marginal effects of hours, days, and wanting extra monthly
hours on job-change probability are presented in Table 4.  For males,
the number of hours and days worked at their initial jobs have little
effect on job-change probability when control variables are included.
In the case of no controls, the coefficient on ln (hours) is twice as large
as that on ln (days), although only the former is significant.  The effect
of the desire for extra hours, however, is significant in both cases,
accounting for about half of the predicted probability when controls are
not included.  For females, a different pattern emerges as the ln (days)
and ln (hours) coefficients are similar in magnitude and significant in
each instance.  The effect of the desire to work extra hours is signifi-
cant in each case and large compared to the predicted probabilities of
each model.
These results are not supportive of the hypothesis that the addition
of days is more costly than the addition of hours, but that could simply
be a result of unobserved heterogeneity between workers, which causes
them to separate from their initial jobs if their preferences do not favor
the given hours/days combination.  Regardless of the reason, this result
shows that the desire to work extra hours significantly increases the
220Table 3 Probit Estimates of Job Change Probability, Males and Femalesa,b
Males Females






































































































































(6.028)Covered by union agreement
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.124  0.012 0.119
Χ2(5, 55, 5 and 54 d.f.) 69.32 1277.03  110.18 1055.43  
Observed P 0.096 0.096 0.090 0.090
Predicted P 0.095 0.061 0.087 0.058
Number of observations 16,280 16,280 14,635 14,629
a Absolute values of t-ratios are in parentheses.
b Controls are marital status, relationship to family head, education, region, mother tongue, immigrant, visible minority, firm size, indus-
try, occupation, and pension coverage.   Age 17–19 is the omitted variable.
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probability of job change for both genders, suggesting that those who
want these hours may face hours and/or days constraints in their initial
jobs and have to change jobs to relax these constraints.    
The fact that extra hours are desired indicates that the individual
may not be in equilibrium at his or her current job.  The interactions of
the extra hours variable with the days and hours variables in Table 3
provide us with additional information about the reasons for job
change.  If a lack of hours (or days) on the current job is the constraint
on lower-than-desired total hours and thus at least part of the motiva-
tion for seeking a new job, then we would expect a negative coefficient
on the interaction term.  For example, if one wanted extra days per
week, the probability of job change should decrease as the number of
days at the current job increase.  The significant negative coefficients
on the extra hours/days interaction variables in the case of males sup-
port this assertion.  For the extra hours/hours interaction, however, we
cannot reject the null of no effect on job-change behavior.  Thus, a
male who wants extra hours is less likely to leave his current job as
days per week increase, while hours per day have no significant effect
on job change.  For females, none of the coefficients on either of the
interaction variables is statistically significant.
These results suggest that for males who do not desire extra hours,
the costs of additional hours of work are higher, at least within their
first jobs, than those of additional days of work because the increase in
Table 4 Effect of Independent Variables on Predicted Job Change 
Probabilitya
Males Females

























Predicted P 0.095 0.061 0.087 0.058
a Absolute values of t-ratios are in parentheses.
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job-change probability is greater for an increase in hours relative to a
comparable increase in days.  For females, increases in both days and
hours result in similar changes in job-change probabilities.  For both
who want more monthly hours, a larger number of hours at the
worker’s initial job has a smaller negative effect on job-change behav-
ior than an equivalent increase in days.  Thus, the probability of job
change decreases as extra hours and days are added within the initial
job, although the negative effect of the latter is larger.  This appears to
be inconsistent with the hypothesis of higher daily fixed costs,
although it may simply imply that the monetary benefits to working
extra days far outweigh the fixed costs of these days.  It may also mean
that job-changers are somewhat constrained in their choices, as new
job offers are more apt to include a higher number of days rather than a
higher number of hours.10
These estimates do give us insight into what motivates job change,
but they tell us little about the changes in hours and days that result
from job change.  This is addressed in the following section. 
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF JOB-CHANGERS
Tables 5 and 6 show the extent to which the means and variances of
ln (days) and ln (hours) vary as workers change jobs.  In both these
tables, columns 1 through 4 display the means and variances of ln
(hours) and ln (days) for each of the two jobs held by job-changers, and
the one job held by job-stayers.  Column 5 shows the mean changes in
log weekly hours as well as the corresponding variances.  Columns 6
and 7 disaggregate weekly hours changes into changes in ln (hours)
and ln (days).  Columns 8 and 9 display the test statistics for differ-
ences in the means and variances in ln (hours) and ln (days) changes.11
We also disaggregate the sample of job-changers, first into voluntary
and involuntary job-changers, and then into those who wanted extra
hours at their first job and those who did not.12  In each of these two
subsamples, significant differences exist between the two groups in
terms of mean changes and variances in almost every time dimension.
For example, both the means and variances of changes in weekly hours
are significantly different when comparing those who desired extra
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Job 1 Job 2 First differences Means Variance
ln (hours) ln (days) ln (hours) ln (days)
Δln (wkly. 
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a The top data row of each pair is the mean (μ) and the second row, in parentheses, is the variance (σ2).
b * and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
226Table 6 Selected Means and Variances of ln(Hours) and ln(Days), Jobs 1 and 2 and First Differences, for Female 
Job-Stayers and Job-Changersa
Tests for differences 
inb
Job 1 Job 2 First differences Means Variance
ln (hours) ln (days) ln (hours) ln (days)
Δln (wkly. 













































































































a The top data row of each pair is the mean (μ) and the second row, in parentheses, is the variance (σ2).
b * and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
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monthly hours with those who did not.13  The evidence appears to sup-
port the hypothesis that flexibility in weekly work schedules is impor-
tant to employees.  
Males who changed jobs worked slightly more hours per day and
marginally fewer days per week at their initial jobs compared with
those who did not change jobs, although only the former difference is
statistically significant.  The variances of both ln (hours) and ln (days),
however, are significantly higher in the case of job-changers than job-
stayers.  Thus, although we cannot reject the hypothesis that the aver-
age job-changer works the same number of daily hours as the average
job-stayer, job-changers show much more variation in their work
schedules at their initial jobs, and this variation persists as they move
into new jobs.  This is generally consistent with the results of Altonji
and Paxson (1986), who found that the variance of time worked in a
number of dimensions (hours/week, weeks/year, or hours/year)
increased for people who changed jobs, relative to those who did not
change jobs.14
For all male job-changers, column 5 of Table 5 shows that job-
changers worked marginally more weekly hours at their new jobs.  Dis-
aggregating these changes into changes in hours and days, however, we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the change in weekly hours was the
result of equal changes in both hours and days.  The variance of days
changes, however, is higher than that of hours at the 5 percent level.
Voluntary changers had an increase in ln (weekly hours) of 0.019, with
the adjustment coming equally from increases in hours and days.
Involuntary changers, by contrast, had a decline of 0.015 in ln (weekly
hours).  Although we cannot reject the hypothesis that the change came
equally from changes in hours and days, we see that the variance of the
change in days is significantly higher than the change in hours.
Males who wanted extra hours had an increase in ln (weekly hours)
of 0.182 compared to a decline of 0.024 for those who did not.  Only in
the former case, however, is the variance of the change in ln (days) sig-
nificantly higher than that of the change in ln (hours).  The higher vari-
ances for those desiring extra hours also imply a great deal of
flexibility in finding the preferred combinations of hours and days.
Similar results are obtained by Altonji and Paxson (1988, 1992), who
found that workers who desired to work more weekly hours were more
likely to increase these hours when they changed jobs.
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The results for females are presented in Table 6 and show much
more variation in all time dimensions compared to males.  Comparing
the distributions of hours and days on the first job between stayers and
changers, both means are significantly larger for job-changers.  For
job-changers, the variance in log hours is significantly smaller than for
stayers while the opposite holds for the variance on ln (days). Female
job-changers find new jobs with only marginally more hours and mar-
ginally fewer days compared to their previous positions, in neither case
are the differences significant.  Changers do, however, move into jobs
with significantly higher variances in both days and hours.
For all female job-changers, average total weekly hours declined
slightly following job change, although the changes in hours and days
are statistically indistinguishable.  The variance of hours changes, how-
ever, is statistically much smaller than the variance of days changes.
Voluntary changers had a modest increase in weekly hours compared
to involuntary changes.  Only in the latter case, however, can we say
that the bulk of this change was the result of the steep decline in days.
Those women who wanted extra hours increased their ln (weekly
hours) by an average of 0.277, the result of an equal increase in both
hours and days.  Those who did not want extra hours saw their mean ln
(weekly hours) decline by 0.075, with most of this decline the result of
a drop in days.  In each case, the variance of the days change is statisti-
cally larger than that of the hours change.  
Both male and female job-changers experience changes in days
and hours as they change jobs.  Mean differences, however, appear to
hide important details.  In many cases we cannot say with certainty that
the adjustment in weekly hours is the result of either changes in days or
hours.  The fact that the variance of changes in days is frequently sig-
nificantly larger in the case of males, and is always significantly larger
in the case of females, shows that the changes in days are much more
flexible than changes in hours when workers change jobs.  This then
implies that changes in days are less flexible than changes in hours
within jobs.  These results are generally inconsistent with those
obtained by Hamermesh (1996) for German and American workers.
Only in the case of German males did the variance of the change in ln
(days) exceed that of the change in ln (hours).  For German women and
American men the opposite held, while there was little difference for
American women.15
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In sum, we have seen that job-changers have a larger number of
hours and days, generally with higher variances at their initial jobs
compared with those who do not change jobs.  Job change does not
increase the average number of hours or days amongst changers but,
with the exception of changes in male days, variances also increase.
Voluntary job-changers of both genders experience higher average
increases in both days and hours than those who do not change jobs
voluntarily, although the variances in the changes of log hours and log
days are larger for involuntary movers.  Finally, those desiring extra
hours at their initial jobs are likely to find these extra hours in the form
of both more daily hours and more days per week, with the variances
here (i.e., on the new job) smaller for those who did not want extra
hours.
In terms of the daily and hourly costs of employment, the above
provides weak evidence that the latter may be proportionately less than
the former.  Only in two cases (female involuntary changers and
females not desiring extra hours) are the differences between mean ln
(hours) and mean ln (days) changes statistically significant.  In both of
these cases, the percentage decline in hours is much smaller than the
percentage decline in days.  This suggests that hours of work are less
costly to eliminate than days of work as these women changed jobs.
Conversely, if we make the reasonable assumption of symmetry of
costs in adding and subtracting days or hours, then adding extra days
are more costly than adding extra hours.
The above results give us a good idea of the differences in mean
hours and days changes along with their dispersions as job-changers
move from one job to the next.  This analysis, however, depends on dif-
ferences in average hours and days changes between groups and thus
could cloud the direction of changes in hours and days as workers
move between jobs.  Looking at the direction and magnitude of
changes in hours and days by job-changers may offer some insights
into what motivates job change.  If daily fixed costs are indeed rela-
tively high compared to hourly costs, we would expect changers to sort
into new jobs with fewer days and more hours, all other things equal.
Furthermore, we might expect these changes to be especially pro-
nounced in the case of voluntary job-changers because they presum-
ably are less constrained in their choices than those who change
involuntarily.  In other words, the voluntarily displaced worker may
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only change jobs if the hours/days combination at the new job is suffi-
ciently different from the original job, a choice which an involuntarily
displaced worker may not have.  We might also expect those who want
extra hours to attain these hours by increasing their daily hours rather
than by increasing days.  Females, who have exhibited more flexibility
in our sample, might also be more apt to change into jobs with rela-
tively fewer days and more hours.   
Tables 7 and 8 show contingency tables for days and hours changes
for male and female job-changers.  In all but one case, χ2 values allow
us to reject the hypothesis that the distributions of days and hours are
independent.16  In other words, changes in hours and days between jobs
are not purely random.   In each of the 10 panels in Tables 7 and 8, no
change in days is more likely than no change in hours for job-changers.
Thus, it appears that rigidities in days are more prevalent than changes
in hours.  If larger fixed costs are incurred on a daily basis, these results
are what we would expect.
The second and third panels of Table 7 show that there are differ-
ences between voluntary and involuntary job-changers.  If voluntary
job-changers are able to sort into a more palatable days/hours combina-
tion, and if the costs of adding a day of work are higher than adding
more hours, we would expect positive hours changes to be more likely
as workers move between jobs.  If we simply look at aggregate days
and hours changes, this does not appear to be the case.  Although vol-
untary changers are more likely to hold on to both their original days
and hours, the distributions show few other differences, if we only look
at column and row totals.  What is interesting is the off-diagonal ele-
ments of each panel.  In this case voluntary changers were about as
likely to increase days and decrease hours as they were to do the oppo-
site.  Involuntary changers, however, were more likely to increase
hours and decrease days than to decrease hours jointly with increasing
days.  This is the opposite of what we expected, although somewhat
supportive of the higher daily fixed costs hypothesis.  This also sug-
gests that factors other than the costs of days and hours exert more of
an influence on voluntary job-changers as they sort into new jobs.  
Those who said they wanted additional hours at their first jobs do,
however, display important differences compared with those who did
not want extra hours.  Job-changers were more likely to have both pos-
itive hours and days changes if they wanted extra hours than if they did
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Table 7 Changes in Hours and Days for Male Job-Changers (%)
Δ Hours
Δ Days ≥ 2.0 0.1– 2.0 0 < 0 & >–2 ≤ –2 Total
All job-changers (n = 1563)a
> 1 2.94 0.70 1.41 0.38 0.70 6.14
1 2.82 1.15 3.20 0.90 1.60 9.66
0 4.73 5.63 49.07 5.76 4.67 69.87
–1 2.30 0.45 2.11 1.15 1.98 8.00
< –1 1.15 0.13 2.05 0.38 2.62 6.33
Total 13.95 8.06 57.84 8.57 11.58 100.00
Voluntary job-changers (n = 1000)b
> 1 3.30 0.40 1.10 0.50 0.80 6.10
1 2.40 1.40 3.10 1.10 1.30 9.30
0 4.20 5.70 51.00 6.40 4.60 71.90
–1 2.30 0.40 1.40 1.20 2.10 7.40
< –1 0.80 0.10 2.20 0.50 1.70 5.30
Total 13.00 8.00 58.80 9.70 10.50 100.00
Involuntary job-changers (n = 563)c
> 1 2.31 1.24 1.95 0.18 0.53 6.22
1 3.55 0.71 3.37 0.53 2.13 10.30
0 5.68 5.51 45.65 4.62 4.80 66.25
–1 2.31 0.53 3.37 1.07 1.78 9.06
< –1 1.78 0.18 1.78 0.18 4.26 8.17
Total 15.63 8.17 56.13 6.57 13.50 100.00
Extra hours wanted (n = 230)d
> 1 6.96 1.30 3.48 2.61 2.17 16.52
1 6.96 2.61 3.04 1.30 1.30 15.22
0 6.09 3.48 41.74 4.78 2.17 58.26
–1 3.04 0.00 0.87 0.87 1.30 6.09
< –1 0.87 0.00 2.17 0.00 0.87 3.91





Δ Days ≥ 2.0 0.1– 2.0 0 < 0 & >–2 ≤ –2 Total
Extra hours not wanted (n = 1080)e
> 1 2.25 0.60 1.05 0.00 0.45 4.35
1 2.10 0.90 3.23 0.83 1.65 8.70
0 4.50 6.00 50.34 5.93 5.10 71.87
–1 2.18 0.53 2.33 1.20 2.10 8.33
< –1 1.20 0.15 2.03 0.45 2.93 6.75
Total 12.23 8.18 58.96 8.40 12.23 100.00
a χ2 (16 d.f.) = 400.33 (p = 0.000)
b χ2 (16 d.f.) = 278.68 (p = 0.000)
c χ2 (16 d.f.) = 151.88 (p = 0.000)
d χ2 (16 d.f.) = 73.98 (p = 0.000)
e χ2 (16 d.f.) = 336.48 (p = 0.000)
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Table 8 Changes in Hours and Days for Female Job-Changers (%)
Δ Hours
Δ Days ≥ 2.0 0.1– 2.0 0 < 0 & >–2 ≤ –2 Total
All job-changers (n = 1318)a
> 1 2.58 1.44 2.35 0.53 1.37 8.27
1 2.43 1.29 2.35 0.61 1.52 8.19
0 4.86 8.27 39.45 4.48 8.35 65.40
–1 1.21 1.29 2.50 0.46 2.43 7.89
< –1 0.91 1.21 3.19 0.46 4.48 10.24
Total 11.99 13.51 49.85 6.53 18.13 100.00
Voluntary job-changers (n = 998)b
> 1 2.71 1.70 2.51 0.60 1.40 8.92
1 2.40 1.00 2.20 0.50 1.60 7.72
0 4.61 8.12 42.28 5.31 8.12 68.44
–1 1.20 1.40 2.10 0.30 1.80 6.81
< –1 0.90 0.80 2.61 0.40 3.41 8.12
Total 11.82 13.03 51.70 7.11 16.33 100.00
Involuntary job-changers (n = 320)c
> 1 2.19 0.62 1.88 0.31 1.25 6.25
1 2.50 2.19 2.81 0.94 1.25 9.69
0 5.62 8.75 30.63 1.88 9.06 55.94
–1 1.25 0.94 3.75 0.94 4.38 11.25
< –1 0.94 2.50 5.00 0.62 7.81 16.88
Total 12.50 15.00 44.06 4.69 23.75 100.00
Extra hours wanted (n = 238)d
> 1 9.24 5.04 5.88 1.26 1.68 23.11
1 6.72 3.78 6.72 1.68 1.68 20.59
0 9.24 6.30 15.97 1.26 5.88 38.66
–1 2.10 2.10 3.36 0.84 2.10 10.50
< –1 2.52 0.84 0.84 0.42 2.52 7.14





Δ Days ≥ 2.0 0.1– 2.0 0 < 0 & >–2 ≤ –2 Total
Extra hours not wanted (n = 1080)e
> 1 1.11 0.65 1.57 0.37 1.30 5.00
1 1.48 0.74 1.39 0.37 1.48 5.46
0 3.89 8.70 44.63 5.19 8.89 71.30
–1 1.02 1.11 2.31 0.37 2.50 7.31
< –1 0.56 1.30 3.70 0.46 4.91 10.93
Total 8.06 12.50 53.61 6.76 19.07 100.00
a χ2 (16 d.f.) = 209.66 (p = 0.000)
b χ2 (16 d.f.) = 164.58 (p = 0.000)
c χ2 (16 d.f.) = 53.19 (p = 0.000)
d χ2 (16 d.f.) = 21.42 (p = 0.163)
e χ2 (16 d.f.) = 166.24 (p = 0.000)
not.  Again, the off-diagonal elements show that these job changes had
a higher propensity to accept more days in combination with fewer
hours rather than fewer days and more hours.  These results are con-
trary to our expectations.   
Female job-changers show more flexibility in changing work
schedules compared with males.  This is reflected by the fact that they
are less likely to move between jobs with identical hours and days
pairs.  Subsamples within female job-changers exhibit similar patterns
to those of male job-changers.  The off-diagonal elements show that in
each of the five cases, female job-changers are marginally more likely
to move into jobs with more hours and fewer days than into jobs with
more days and fewer hours.  This evidence is mildly supportive of our
hypothesis of higher fixed costs of working more days.
In sum, these results suggest that there is a great deal of rigidity in
job schedules.  This is especially true of days per week since job-
changers are less likely to change days than to change hours.  As we
have already discussed above (Table 1), females generally have more
flexibility in their work schedules than men.  Job change simply
increases this flexibility.
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CONCLUSIONS
By disaggregating weekly labor supply into hours per day and days
per week, we have learned several interesting things.  In bivariate dis-
tributions, employees tend to be clustered around standard hours and
days, with men on average exhibiting less flexibility in hours and days
worked than women.  The self-employed are much less likely to work
standard hours and days.  Most of the self-employed males work both
more hours and days compared to paid employees.  Self-employed
females also work more hours and days, but they are also more likely
to work fewer hours per day.
The OLS estimates of hours and days supplied show that women
with young children supply less labor in both dimensions, although the
percentage drop in days is significantly larger.  This implies that child
care costs are borne on a daily basis, or at least are higher on a daily
basis than an hourly basis.
Probit estimates show that a larger number of hours at the worker’s
initial job are significantly related to an increased probability of job
change for both genders.  Days per week are also a significant determi-
nant of job change for females but have little effect on male job change
behavior.  For both genders, the desire for extra hours is related to
increased probability of job change.  As extra days are added at the ini-
tial job, this probability declines.  The addition of hours at the initial
job, however, has no significant effect on job change among those who
want extra monthly hours.  These results do not generally support the
hypothesis that daily costs of employment are higher than hourly costs,
although these costs may have been outweighed by the benefits of
working more days, which may be the motivating factor behind job
change.
A more detailed analysis of hours and days changes reveals that
job-changers desire flexibility in their weekly work schedules.  Not
only do job-changers show more variability in their days and hours
compared to job-stayers at their first jobs, but this carries over to their
new jobs as well.  The wider distribution in days changes compared to
hours changes implies that flexibility in days is more important to job-
changers than flexibility in hours.  That working standard days is more
common than working standard hours in the sample simply underlines
the importance of flexibility in days, at least amongst job-changers.
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The direction of hours and days changes suggests that there is a
great deal of rigidity in weekly work schedules, especially in terms of
days.  Male job-changers are much more likely than females to move
into new jobs with the same or very similar days and hours combina-
tions.  The fact that women are marginally more likely to increase
hours and decrease days than to do the opposite, is mildly supportive of
the hypothesis of higher daily fixed costs.
On the basis of the evidence presented above, we cannot say con-
clusively that the daily or hourly costs of employment drive the behav-
ior of individuals, although they do appear to be influential.  We can
conclude that workers do desire more flexibility in their choice of
hours and days.  This is particularly true of days.  Our analysis also
points to the difficulty that workers may encounter in attaining optimal
hours and days combinations.  What we can conclude with more cer-
tainty is that using weekly hours, or more aggregated labor supply
measures, hides important differences in the labor supply decisions of
individuals.
Underlying the fact that the common labor supply aggregates hide
important details are a host of policy implications.  We have argued
that the costs of employment are largely incurred on a daily rather than
an hourly basis.  Workers must get out of bed, go through the physical
preparations for work, prepare lunches, get the kids ready for the day
ahead and transport them to daycare or school before braving the daily
commute to the worksite.  This all happens before they actually do or
are paid for work in the market.  At the end of the day, this scenario is
largely reversed.  Every one of these costs is incurred on a daily basis,
regardless of the number of hours actually worked.  While little can be
done about most of these daily costs, child care and commuting do
have important policy implications for employers and for government.
The importance of young children in females’ labor force partici-
pation decisions is already well-known.  The results above also show
that the presence of young children influences labor supply differently
along the hours and days dimensions.  This suggests that policies that
reduce the daily costs of child care might be more important than those
that reduce the hourly costs.  Company provision of child care facilities
at the worksite, for example, could result in significant savings to par-
ents in terms of the time and dollar expenses of delivering children to
an outside facility before commuting to work.  For the employer, a bet-
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ter understanding of workers’ time preferences could mean lower turn-
over rates, thus lowering associated costs.  It could also mean less
absenteeism and enhanced productivity from employees if they are
able to work their desired hours/days combinations.  
The increase in flexible working schedules has arguably been use-
ful in reducing rush-hour traffic congestion in many North American
cities (although increasing the length of the “hour”).  This has likely
resulted in reduced daily commute times and the costs of traveling to
and from the worksite.  Increased flexibility could further reduce these
daily commuting costs.  As cities continue to spread out over larger
geographical areas, commute times, and the expenses associated with
them, may also grow.  A one-hour commute to the worksite in any
major urban center in Canada is no longer considered unreasonable.
The increased direct and indirect costs associated with longer com-
mutes, along with the growth in appropriate technology, are undoubt-
edly reasons for the increased popularity of telecommuting.  What does
having the ability to work at home imply about the desired hours/days
combination?  Obviously the costs of both time dimensions decrease,
but what is the optimal combination for the employee?  
Related to this are public policy decisions regarding the provision
of roadways and public transportation.  Such decisions could benefit
from a better understanding of days and hours preferences.  If employ-
ees prefer to have more flexible daily hours and work fewer days per
week, a large investment in public transportation facilities would not be
warranted as the number of daily trips would be reduced.
There exists a potential for fruitful research on this subject.  One
option would be to estimate the costs of hours and days of work using a
hedonic wage model.  In doing so, we could arrive at estimates of the
magnitude to which workers would have to be compensated to vary
their hours/days combinations.  This would give a good indication of
the relative daily and hourly costs of employment.  A second option
would be to use panel data to analyze the shocks to individual utility
functions that result in changes in hours and days for both job-stayers
and job-changers.  Disaggregating weekly labor supply into its days
and hours components is an important, albeit first, step in analyzing a
rich variety of policy questions.
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Notes
1. Hamermesh (1996) notes that most surveys ask the question, “How many hours
did you work last week?”
2. Cogan (1980, 1981), Hanoch (1980b), and Hausman (1980) have all shown that
higher fixed costs of entering the labor force result in lower participation rates.
Since average fixed costs decline over the number of hours worked, a person must
be able to work a minimum number of hours to recoup these costs.
3. Specifically, the questions asked were 1) How many weeks per month did [the
subject] usually work at this job? 2) In those weeks, how many paid days per
week did he/she usually work?  3) On those days, how many paid hours per day
did he/she usually work?
4. In Table 1, the sample is broadened to include the self-employed, but only where
appropriate data is available.  Unfortunately, the LMAS only includes data on
hours and days for a subsample of the self-employed.  For this reason, the analysis
past Table 1 will be limited to paid workers only.
5. Specifically, we began with a with a sample of 30,924 males and 32,092 females.
By eliminating those who held no jobs in 1990, the male (female) sample was
reduced by 4,766 (10,326).  The self-employed were also dropped (5,131 males
and 2,728 females), as were full-time students (2,985 males and 2,746 females).
Also eliminated were 179 males and 124 females who did not meet our age crite-
ria, and 70 males and 71 females who claimed to work more than 18 hours per day
or earn less than $1.00 per hour at their first job.  Another 737 males and 536
females were dropped because they held more than two jobs in 1990.  An addi-
tional 821 males and 924 females did not meet our criterion of no job overlap.
Finally, 5 males (2 females) either earned less than $1.00 per hour or worked more
than 18 hours per day at their second jobs (if they held second jobs) and were
dropped.  This leaves us with 16,280 males and 14,635 females.
6. An additional 140 males and 72 females who held paid jobs preceding self-
employment were removed.
7. Direct comparability is a problem because Hamermesh uses an 8-hour day as a
standard workday, whereas we define the range 7.5 to 8.5 hours to be standard.
8. The hourly wage rate is not included as a regressor because it is generally derived
from earnings per time period and the number of hours worked per time period
(the exception is for workers paid by the hour because hourly wage data was col-
lected independently of hours and days data).  Such introduction of the wage into
the regressions would result in a negative spurious correlation with the hours and
days variables.
9. Weiss (1984) found younger workers more likely to quit than older workers.  Far-
ber (1980) and Freeman (1980) discussed the lower quit probabilities of unionists
in the United States.  Blau and Kahn (1981), Meitzen (1986), and Sicherman
(1996) all found a negative correlation between tenure and quit behavior.
10. Part of the reason for these inconsistent results may be as a result of our treatment
of days as a continuous variable when in fact it is an integer.
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11. Throughout this section we use the statistic
where are the sample means of the two distributions, are the corre-
sponding estimated variances, and are the sample sizes.  With large sample
sizes, this approximates a normal distribution.   For testing differences in esti-
mated variances, we use the statistic
where the variables have already been defined and .
12. Those respondents who changed jobs because of a labor dispute, a layoff, a com-
pany moving or going out of business (i.e., a plant closure), or a dismissal are con-
sidered involuntary movers.  Voluntary movers changed jobs because of an illness
or disability, personal or family responsibilities, to move to a new residence or
return to school, a retirement, a new job, or because of a variety of poor working
conditions.
13. All such pairwise comparisons are statistically different (at least the 10 percent) in
both means and variances of changes.  The exceptions are the means of ln (daily)
hours at the first job between male stayers and changers, mean changes in ln
(weekly) and ln (daily) hours between male voluntary and involuntary changers,
and mean changes in ln (daily) hours between female voluntary and involuntary
changers.
14. This analysis suffers from censored data because we are only able to observe
hours/days changes for job-changers.  Altonji and Paxson (1986) have panel data
and can use a “difference-in-difference” approach.
15. These comparisons are not strictly equivalent.  Hamermesh uses a “difference-in-
difference” approach,  comparing changers and stayers.  Data limitations prevent
us from performing similar calculations.
16. The exception is in the case of females who desired extra hours.  Given that the
distribution is skewed in favor of both more days and hours, the fact that we can’t
reject this hypothesis comes as little surprise.
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Table A1 Sample Mean Personal and Job Characteristics of Male and 
















(hours/day) job 1 8.448 8.435 8.556 7.398 7.387 7.516
(hours/day) job 2 N/A N/A 8.597 N/A N/A 7.540
(days/week) job 1 5.012 5.011 5.019 4.625 4.617 4.712
(days/week)  job 2 N/A N/A 5.026 N/A N/A 4.675
Voluntarily left job 1 N/A N/A 0.640 N/A N/A 0.757
Extra monthly hours 
wanted at job 1




17–19 0.017 0.014 0.054 0.012 0.010 0.032
20–24 0.090 0.081 0.177 0.088 0.077 0.193
25–34 0.303 0.294 0.386 0.324 0.315 0.407
35–44 0.295 0.300 0.240 0.306 0.313 0.239
45–54 0.187 0.196 0.106 0.188 0.197 0.101
55–64 0.107 0.114 0.038 0.082 0.087 0.027
Children
Number of kids 
ages 0–2
0.144 0.142 0.150 0.130 0.132 0.110
Number of kids 
ages 3–5
0.146 0.145 0.152 0.133 0.133 0.132
Number of kids 
ages > 5
0.907 0.914 0.845 0.897 0.902 0.838
Marital status (%)
Married 0.748 0.759 0.633 0.745 0.754 0.659
Single 0.204 0.192 0.322 0.157 0.147 0.250
Other 0.048 0.049 0.044 0.098 0.099 0.091
Relationship to 
family head (%)
Head 0.815 0.825 0.711 0.253 0.249 0.290
Spouse 0.058 0.056 0.075 0.664 0.674 0.562
Other 0.127 0.118 0.214 0.083 0.077 0.148
(continued)

















Elementary 0.094 0.095 0.088 0.054 0.054 0.047
Some high school 0.224 0.221 0.250 0.180 0.179 0.181
Graduated high 
school
0.227 0.227 0.230 0.272 0.271 0.285
Some
postsecondary
0.093 0.091 0.107 0.099 0.097 0.124
Postsecondary
diploma
0.126 0.128 0.109 0.191 0.192 0.175
University degree 0.139 0.142 0.105 0.131 0.134 0.096
Trade 0.097 0.096 0.111 0.075 0.073 0.092
Region (%)
BC 0.105 0.104 0.115 0.099 0.097 0.113
Prairies 0.269 0.266 0.291 0.289 0.287 0.305
Ontario 0.205 0.208 0.183 0.210 0.210 0.216
Quebec 0.160 0.161 0.152 0.149 0.154 0.105
Atlantic 0.261 0.261 0.259 0.252 0.252 0.260
Native language (%)
English 0.722 0.720 0.744 0.738 0.733 0.789
French 0.187 0.187 0.184 0.175 0.179 0.144
Other 0.092 0.093 0.072 0.087 0.089 0.067
Other characteristics 
(%)
Immigrant 0.097 0.099 0.079 0.093 0.094 0.078
Visible minority 0.032 0.032 0.030 0.034 0.034 0.027
Job characteristics
Firm size (%)
19 or fewer 
employees
0.218 0.203 0.345 0.260 0.254 0.309
20–99 employees 0.156 0.151 0.198 0.149 0.149 0.149
100–499 employees 0.122 0.124 0.106 0.126 0.127 0.115
500 or more 
employees
0.363 0.379 0.220 0.326 0.333 0.263


















Primary (01–08) 0.091 0.089 0.107 0.031 0.031 0.029
Construction
(29–30, 52)
0.098 0.089 0.175 0.016 0.015 0.019
Manufacturing
(09–28)




0.182 0.187 0.146 0.069 0.069 0.062
Business services 
(37–39, 44)
0.058 0.057 0.062 0.115 0.112 0.144
Consumer services 
(36, 43, 45–47)













0.133 0.137 0.087 0.104 0.103 0.112
Professional and 
technical (04–16)
0.128 0.131 0.106 0.225 0.234 0.143
Clerical (17–22) 0.056 0.056 0.061 0.308 0.309 0.309
Sales (23–24) 0.059 0.057 0.077 0.086 0.085 0.098
Service (25–28) 0.084 0.084 0.087 0.167 0.163 0.203
Primary (29–33) 0.064 0.062 0.087 0.018 0.018 0.022





0.161 0.163 0.141 0.030 0.031 0.029
(continued)























0.126 0.127 0.116 0.022 0.022 0.024
Other
occupations (50)
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Other
Covered by union 
agreement (%)
0.453 0.476 0.266 0.384 0.402 0.214
Part-time
employment
(<120 hours per 
month) (%)
0.043 0.038 0.086 0.246 0.248 0.222
Tenure at job 
(weeks)
412 445 136 296 315 114
Covered by pension 
(%)
0.396 0.395 0.409 0.328 0.327 0.336
Number of 
observations
16,280 14,577 1,563 14,635 13,245 1,318
aValues may not add to 100% due to rounding.
bLMAS industry codes.




No job controls Job controls No job controls Job controls




20–24 years 0.0493 0.0385 0.0501 0.0413 0.0327 0.0853 *** 0.0248 0.0787 ***
(4.067) (3.667) (4.239) (3.970) (1.441) (3.373) (1.115) (3.160)
25–34 years 0.0549 0.0412 0.0537 0.0460 0.0225 0.0785 *** 0.0010 0.0553 ***
(4.516) (3.918) (4.522) (4.392) (1.008) (3.156) (0.045) (2.251)
35–44 years 0.0371 0.0322 0.0427 0.0392 0.0106 0.0688 *** –0.0175 0.0385 ***
(3.006) (3.007) (3.518) (3.667) (0.467) (2.735) (0.787) (1.542)
45–54 years 0.0227 0.0310 0.0317 0.0377 –0.0176 0.0395 *** –0.0413 0.0118 ***
(1.792) (2.832) (2.530) (3.414) (0.763) (1.541) (1.816) (0.463)
55–64 years –0.0165 0.0198 ** –0.0036 0.0269 * –0.0807 –0.0362 –0.1025 –0.0637
(1.251) (1.732)  (0.278) (2.337) (3.371) (1.360) (4.319) (2.399)
Children



























































Single –0.0216 –0.0094 *** –0.0170 –0.0070 0.0062 0.0306 *** 0.0069 0.0317 ***
(3.966) (2.002) (3.203) (1.489) (0.586) (2.583) (0.660) (2.717)
Other 0.0033 –0.0106  0.0031 –0.0104  0.0182 0.0395  0.0192 0.0400
(0.477) (1.756) (0.459) (1.737) (1.648) (3.215) (1.779) (3.304)
Relationship to 
family head
Spouse –0.0070 –0.0106 –0.0018 –0.0088 –0.0201 –0.0207  –0.0195 –0.0191  
(1.115) (1.951) (0.294) (1.637) (2.307) (2.136) (2.281) (1.995)
Other –0.0293 –0.0147 *** –0.0309 –0.0168 *** –0.0063 –0.0229 –0.0042 –0.0217






































































































No job controls Job controls No job controls Job controls
Hours Days t Hours Days t Hours Days t Hours Days t
Trade –0.0243 –0.0178 –0.0037 –0.0147 0.0343 –0.0250 * 0.0407 –0.0193 *
(3.628) (3.058) (0.551) (2.518) (2.609) (1.713)  (3.040) (1.290)
Region
BC 0.0140 –0.0104 * 0.0099 –0.0129 * –0.0104 –0.0324 *** –0.0010 –0.0201
(2.568) (2.202) (1.851) (2.729) (1.176) (3.296) (0.109) (2.056)
Prairies 0.0113 0.0035 0.0080 –0.0029 ** –0.0154 –0.0365 ** –0.0041 –0.0274 **
(2.649) (0.948) (1.886) (0.780) (2.331) (4.965) (0.626) (3.732)
Quebec –0.0279 –0.0022 * –0.0183 –0.0012 ** –0.0300 –0.0021 ** –0.0294 –0.0029 ***
(4.457) (0.408) (2.986) (0.227) (3.006) (0.192) (3.005) (0.267)
Atlantic 0.0152 0.0133 0.0134 0.0080 0.0172 0.0255 0.0257 0.0335
(3.440) (3.469) (3.043) (2.071) (2.459) (3.284) (3.672) (4.282)
Native language
French 0.0036 –0.0041 –0.0021 –0.0034 –0.0024 0.0022 –0.0025 0.0065
(0.678) (0.888) (0.399) (0.760) (0.287) (0.232) (0.297) (0.700)
Other –0.0152 –0.0042 –0.0191 –0.0030 ** –0.0063 0.0015 –0.0084 –0.0005
(2.377) (0.758) (3.068) (0.551) (0.640) (0.132) (0.870) (0.049)
Other
Immigrant 0.0095 0.0104 0.0115 0.0100 –0.0019 0.0056 –0.0015 0.0092
(1.498) (1.906) (1.870) (1.834) (0.193) (0.515) (0.155) (0.851)
249
Visible minority –0.0243 –0.0059 *** –0.0153 –0.0025 0.0475 0.0765 0.0427 0.0680


































Don’t know 0.0135 –0.0022 ** –0.0048 0.0236 *
(2.671) (0.488) (0.629) (2.746)
Industry group
Goods sector
Construction –0.0460 0.0143 * –0.0730 0.0229 *
(5.366) (1.892) (2.893) (0.812)
Manufacturing –0.0808 –0.0040 * 0.0266 0.0477













Business services –0.1093 –0.0003 * –0.0171 0.0285 ***






No job controls Job controls No job controls Job controls






















































Sales 0.0321 0.0268 –0.0033 –0.0409 *
(3.835) (3.631) (0.359) (3.960)
Service 0.0283 –0.0026 * –0.0265 –0.0163
(3.599) (0.375) (3.442) (1.899)
Primary 0.0563 0.0678 0.0521 0.0966
(5.757) (7.874) (2.316) (3.837)
Processing 0.0663 0.0079 * 0.0668 0.0174 **





































Other occupation 0.1344 0.0720 –0.0233 –0.0521


































Constant 2.1163 1.5883 * 2.1341 1.5712 * 1.9751 1.5201 * 1.9535 1.4841 *
(151.034) (130.867) (127.509) (106.577) (75.150) (52.004) (61.491) (41.755)






No job controls Job controls No job controls Job controls








0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Number of 
observations
16,280 16,280 14,635 14,635
a *, **, and *** denote that the pairwise t-statistics are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
b Omitted categorical variables are age 17–19, married, head of household, elementary education, Ontario, English, 19 or fewer employ-
ees, primary industry group and clerical occupation group.
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Table A3 Full Probit Results from Table 3a,b
Males Females































































































































































































































































































































































































Pseudo R2 0.007 0.124  0.012 0.119
χ2 (5, 55, 5 and 54 d.f.) 69.32 1277.03  110.18 1055.43  
Observed P 0.096 0.096 0.090 0.090
Predicted P 0.095 0.061 0.087 0.058
Number of observations 16,280 16,280 14,635 14,629
a Absolute t-ratios are in parentheses.
b Omitted categorical variables are age 17–19, married, head of household, elementary education, Ontario, English native language, 19 or








Patterns, Trends, and the 
Policy Implications














W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007–4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are
the sole responsibility of the authors.  They do not necessarily represent positions of
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by J.R. Underhill.
Index prepared by Nancy Humphreys.
Printed in the United States of America.
